The Conformity of Faith with Reason in the “Discours Préliminaire” of the Theodicy by Antognazza, Maria Rosa

Maria Rosa Antognazza
The Conformity of Faith with Reason in the “Discours Préliminaire” of the Theodicy

(Published in Lectures et interprétations des Essais de théodicée de G. W. Leibniz. Ed. by Paul Rateau [Studia Leibnitiana Sonderhefte 40]. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2011, pp. 231-245).

‘Against reason’ and ‘above reason’

The “Preliminary Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason” prefixed to the Theodicy can be regarded as Leibniz’s most prominent manifesto on the relationship between faith and reason.​[1]​ Into it flow thoughts matured in the course of a lifetime: in a single overview Leibniz considers characters, works, and positions discussed in previous years, starting from his very earliest writings. Although the direct antagonist of Leibniz in this case is Pierre Bayle, there are many fronts in Leibniz’s battle, aimed at establishing the extent, as well as the limits, of the use of reason in theology.​[2]​ Bayle's position (at least his ostensible one) is well known. Human reason is incapable of resolving the problem of evil, in the face of which the following question remains without an answer: if there is only one God, immensely good, all-knowing and all-powerful, why does evil exist in the world?​[3]​ The fact that reason cannot give an answer to this and similar questions, stirring up instead only doubts, is nothing but a consequence of its weakness and incapacity to arrive at the truth. If reason brings up insoluble objections against the truths of faith, this must not, however, lead to the rejection of faith. The well-known outcome is of a fedeistic character: faced with the irreconcilability of faith with reason, one must silence reason, since it is a weak and imperfect instrument; instead one must embrace faith.​[4]​
It is this thesis of the contradiction between faith and reason that, according to Leibniz, is to be refuted before one can confront the problem of evil. Between faith and reason there is conformity, in that both have truth as their object and two truths cannot contradict one another. Truth is only one: there are no truths of faith that are in contrast with truths of reason, because in the last analysis both come from God.​[5]​ To the controversy specifically directed against Bayle is added a more general attack against the so-called Averroistic doctrine of double truth6 -- a doctrine that, about a century earlier, had newly been the object of violent controversy in the nearby University of Helmstedt.7 Against Bayle and against the supporters of a double truth, one philosophical and the other theological, Leibniz confirms his usual position: one cannot demonstrate the contrary of truth; there are no insoluble objections against truth, because that would go against the principle of non-contradiction, which is the foundation of all logic and the ultimate criterion of the distinction between truth and falsity. If one were to demonstrate that an article of faith, a dogma, involves contradiction, one would have demonstrated in an incontrovertible way that this alleged article of faith is false and is simply the invention of some theologian.8
At this point, though, another front is opened, against which Leibniz in the Theodicy unleashes his final attack: namely, the Socinian, or more generally, the anti-Trinitarian front. The Socinians represent the opposite pole compared to the (at least ostensible) position of Bayle and the supporters of the irreconcilability of philosophy and theology.9 A common, indispensable starting point for both Leibniz and the Socinians is the conformity between faith and reason. Such conformity implies, once again for both, the conformity of revealed truths with the principle of non-contradiction. This principle holds, Leibniz insists, without exception, even in the case of the most problematic of all mysteries, the mystery of the Trinity. Any attempt to defend the mystery of the Trinity by admitting an exception to the fundamental logical principle that ‘things which are identical to a third thing are identical to one another’ (quae eadem sunt eidem tertio sunt eadem inter se) would inevitably lead to results precisely the opposite of those intended, namely: to confirmation of the Socinian thesis according to which the mystery of the Trinity is irrational and must therefore be rejected as false.
For this reason, Leibniz insists in section 22 of the “Preliminary Discourse,” 

“[...] certain Authors have been too quick to agree that the Holy Trinity is contrary to this great principle, which holds that two things that are the same as a third are also the same as each other; that is to say, if A is the same as B, and if C is the same as B, then A and C must also be the same as each other. For this principle is an immediate consequence of the principle of non-contradiction, and is the foundation of all Logic; and if it ceases, there is no way to reason with certitude. . . . And one can say generally that it is necessary to be on guard never to abandon the necessary and eternal truths, in order to support the Mysteries, lest the enemies of religion take therefrom the right to deny both Religion and the Mysteries.”10

But can one maintain this conformity without falling into the Socinian or anti-Trinitarian position? In the "Preliminary Discourse," Leibniz recapitulates all the passages of a by now well rehearsed strategy, adopted since his very early writings and insistently re-used in the following years. The first move is to recall the traditional distinction between ‘against reason’ and ‘above reason,’11 invoking in its support the distinction between necessary truths and truths of fact: only what goes against “absolutely certain and indispensable truths” is against reason (and therefore impossible); what contrasts only with experience can be, instead, above reason.12 Moreover, according to Leibniz, the ambit of truths superior to the human capacity of comprehension is not restricted to the mysteries of faith. On the contrary, it embraces also the ‘mystery’ of universal harmony and the distinct knowledge of an infinity of natural things.13 His insistence on the parallel between incomprehensibility in the supernatural sphere and incomprehensibility in the natural sphere is particularly evident in the “Annotatiunculae subitaneae ad Tolandi Librum De Christianismo Mysteriis carente” (8 August 1701) where he writes: “the comprehension itself of individual substances is impossible to the created mind because they involve the infinite. For this reason it is impossible to provide a perfect explanation of the things of the universe [Unde fit ut rerum universi perfecta ratio reddi non possit]. And nothing prevents certain divinely revealed dogmas from being so.”14 The mysteries, therefore, precisely because they exceed the limits of the human intellect, are by definition incomprehensible truths. This does not mean, though, that they are against reason: their impossibility would have to be positively demonstrated, since their incomprehensibility and dissimiliarity with what we are used to observing in nature is not sufficient to reject them as irrational.15 In the Nouveaux Essais Leibniz establishes explicitly that, in the case of a contrast between the literal meaning of the sacred scripture and “a great appearance of Logical impossibility, or at least a recognized physical impossibilty”, unless it regards a clear attribution of imperfection to God (as in the case of anthropomorphism), one must stick to the letter: once again, the impossibility must be demonstrated, for in order to abandon the literal sense of the Scriptures an apparent contradiction based on what happens in nature is not enough.16
In other words, Leibniz reproaches both Bayle and the Socinians with two types of confusion. In the first place, they confuse ‘above’ and ‘against’ reason. By removing this distinction, Bayle goes so far as to affirm that one must believe as superior to reason even that which is against it. On the opposite side, the Socinians end up in fact by denying the superrational sphere, since finite human reason rejects as irrational all that it cannot comprehend. The second type of confusion is the undue shift from improbability to impossibility, that is to say from what is against likelihood to what is against reason.
However, against this defence by Leibniz of the mysteries as supernatural truths, an objection can be raised, which is precisely the objection formulated by Bayle in the Dictionaire historique et critique and reported by Leibniz in sections 72 and 73 of the “Preliminary Discourse”:

“It is evident that reason will never attain to what is above it. Now, if it could supply answers to the objections that are brought against the dogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to these two mysteries, it would subject them to itself, and would submit them to the strictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or with the aphorisms stemming from common notions; and so proceed until finally it had concluded that they agree with the natural light. It would therefore do what surpasses its power; it would go beyond its limits, which is formally contradictory. . . . if some doctrines are above reason, they are beyond its range, it cannot attain to them.”17

It is the same objection that, years later, in 1773, also Lessing insinuates in his ironic comment on Leibniz’s “Defensio Trinitatis” (1669*):18 to bring onto the field, in defence of the mysteries, the shield of incomprehensibility, is equivalent to placing the mysteries outside the radius of action of natural human reason. Certainly in this case reason cannot raise any objection, but at the price of the absolute separation and incommensurability between faith and reason. And it is exactly this conclusion that the first publisher of the “Defensio Trinitatis” draws: “Reason is not the tribunal with jurisdiction over divine matters.”19

The notion of ‘presumption’ and the ‘strategy of defence’

How, then, can reason judge what by definition exceeds its limits of comprehension? The line of argumentation adopted by Leibniz in order to be able to maintain the conformity between faith and reason in the case of superrational truths now comes into play: a line of argumentation that marks the difference between Leibniz’s position and that of the Socinians. The notion of ‘presumption’ plays a central role here. For something that has not yet been positively demonstrated, or even more, something that cannot be positively demonstrated, a presumption of truth can be invoked and held valid until one has proof of the opposite.20 Or again, considered from another perspective, "every time Logical necessity is not demonstrated, one can presume in a proposition only physical necessity."21
	Let us pause here and consider more in depth this key notion. This concept of presumption is employed in a particularly clear way in the “Defensio Trinitatis”, where, for example, after having refuted the first argument brought by Socinian Andreas Wissowatius against the Trinity, Leibniz concludes: “Until the contrary has been more adequately proved, we will continue to maintain this statement: that the Son and the Holy Spirit are he who is the one God”.22 Later, in an even more explicit fashion, Leibniz asserts, “Anything is presumed [to be] possible until the contrary is proved”.23
The thesis that “Anything is presumed [to be] possible until the contrary is proved” or, as we read in a text of 1702, that “any being must be judged possible, donec probetur contrarium, until it is shown that it is not [possible]”,24 is for Leibniz a general metaphysical thesis, valid beyond the case of the mysteries – in short, it is the thesis that presumption favours possibility and that, therefore, the onus probandi falls on those who deny this possibility.
However, it can be objected that, according to this thesis, the possibility of opposite and incompatible types of beings can equally be presumed.25 It is equally justified to presume the possibility of a Tri-une God and of a ‘monolithic’ God excluding any sort of internal differentiation; it is equally justified to presume the possibility of three persons in the only one God or the possibility of three separate Gods. In other words, any religious belief can appeal to the same presumption of truth. To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz does not explicitly grant this, but he does not attempt to deny it either. The right to the presumption of truth ought to be and can safely be extended in principle to all religious beliefs, without undermining Leibniz’s strategy. Other religions can equally claim the presumption of their truth. Leibniz seems to be convinced that this presumption of truth, when it is clearly incompatible with the teaching of the Christian religion, can be overthrown. This can be done either in the strongest way, by proving that a certain belief (for instance, polytheism) in fact implies contradiction or in a ‘softer’ way, by showing that an alleged revelation lacks the necessary marks of authenticity. In Leibniz’s terms, “motives of credibility” can be given in favour of the Christian religion which cannot be provided for other religious beliefs. It is clear however that it is not the rule of the presumption of possibility as such which can tilt the balance in favour of the specifically Christian revelation, because such presumption fails to discriminate between alternative religious conceptions.26 This task is addressed through the production of the “motives of credibility” of the Christian religion above and beyond any other religion.27
	Another early explanation of the concept of presumption, particularly relevant to the case of the mysteries, can be found in a draft of the early “Elementa Juris naturalis” (1670-1671*). According to Leibniz the distinction between presumption and probability is similar to that between demonstration and induction:

In presumption, we demonstrate from the nature of a thing that something is easier and therefore that it is to be presumed to be more frequent. [...] In probable induction, on the contrary, we know that something is more frequent and therefore we presume that it is easier. To presume is (a) to hold the uncertain for certain in practice (b) to hold something as certain until the opposite is proved.28 

This distinction of presumption from probability seems to go hand in glove with the case of the mysteries. As Leibniz himself suggests, ‘another logic’ is needed for the mysteries. It seems, however, that this logic cannot, strictly speaking, be identified with the logic of probability. The mysteries, as Leibniz writes in the early “Commentatiuncula de Judice Controversiarum” (1669-1670*), are improbable according to reason. Nevertheless, from this improbability by no means follows an impossibility.29 In order to affirm that a given proposition is impossible, it is in fact necessary to provide a positive demonstration that it contains a contradiction. On the contrary, by means of induction from other examples (namely, from what normally takes place or from what has already been observed in nature), one can legitimately infer only the improbability of something.30 This idea of the improbability of the mysteries presented in the “Commentatiuncula” seems in turn to correspond to the statement in “De Demonstratione Possibilitatis Mysteriorum Euchari​stiae” (1671*) that the mysteries “at first glance are seen as impossible” (“prima fronte impossibi​les videri”)31 and to the claim, often repeated in the Theodicy, that they are against appearances and contrary to the verisimilitudes of reason.32 As long as their impossibility has not been positively proved, however, we are justified “to consider true” (verum putare)33 or “to hold as certain” (pro certo habere)34 that which has been handed down by revelation.
	The status of presumptive knowledge is further specified in Leibniz’s later writings. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Philalethes asserts that something is presumed “when it is taken to be true before it is proved.”35 Theophilus responds by correcting Philalethes’ statement:

As for ‘presumption’, which is a jurists’ term, good usage in legal circles distinguishes it from ‘conjecture’. It is something more than that, and should be accepted provisionally as true until there is a proof to the contrary [...] In this sense, therefore, to presume something is not to accept it before it has been proved, which is never permissible, but to accept it provisionally but not groundlessly, while waiting for a proof to the contrary.36

In the thirty-third paragraph of the “Preliminary Discourse” of the Theodicy, Leibniz presents a similar view: “amongst lawyers that is called ‘presumption’ which must provisionally pass for truth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than ‘conjecture’”. This description of presumptive knowledge seems once again to adapt itself well to the mysteries. We have seen that one of the problems posed by the mysteries is the following: how can reason recognize as true that which surpasses the limits of its comprehension? By means of the concept of presumption Leibniz suggests that the mysteries are simply assumed to be true by exercising one’s right of presumption of truth until such time as their impossibility is proved.
	At this point a further characteristic of presumption comes fully into view. The presumption of truth admits the possibility that its contrary might be demonstrated; that is to say, it admits the possibility that the thesis presumed to be true might on the contrary be demonstrated to be false. When Leibniz in the “Commentatiuncula” writes that faith “is compatible with the fear of the opposite”,37 he seems to mean precisely this: since, “because of the obscurity of the human mind”,38 the truth of the revealed propositions cannot be demonstrated, one must hypothetically admit that the contrary of these propositions could be demonstrated. At this point, the task of the defender of the mysteries is precisely to dispel “the fear of the opposite”, repelling time and again the attempts to prove the contrary. The gamble of the defender of the mysteries is that no such proof exists.
The second aspect of Leibniz’s procedure comes into play at this point: what I call the ‘strategy of defence’ that finds in the "Preliminary Discourse" its most explicit formulation and also its definitive consecration as the way to save the conformity between faith and reason without subjecting faith to reason. As Leibniz points out, the presumption of truth has the power to shift the burden of proof from the defender of a thesis to its attacker.39 Therefore, to the objection of Bayle mentioned above, Leibniz replies by saying that the burden of proof falls on the opponents of the mysteries and not on their defenders: it is the opponent that must make it evident that the mystery is false; the supporter, admitting the mystery on the basis of the revelation guaranteed by the church tradition, recognizes from the beginning that it is impossible to make it something evident; his only task is to respond to the adversary by forcing him to prove in good form all his utterances or, at most, by pointing out the equivocation concealed in the objection, without this involving a positive argumentation in favor of the thesis being attacked.40 To respond to the objections, it is thus by no means necessary to submit the mysteries to the examination of reason in the attempt to make them comprehensible; they are simply taken as true (presumed true) until their falsity is proved. It is in this sense that reason can attain to what is superior to it: not by "penetrating inside the matter," but by showing that the objections brought up till now have not been able to demonstrate its impossibility.41

Section 5 of the "Preliminary Discourse" and the "motives of credibility"

What has been said so far helps us to understand better the famous section 5 of the "Preliminary Discourse," which in a few lines expresses the kernel of Leibniz’s doctrine on the relationship between faith and reason: 

“[...] there is often a bit of confusion in the expressions of those who put together Philosophy and Theology, or Faith and Reason: they confuse explain, comprehend, prove and support. And I find that Mr. Bayle, penetrating though he may be, is not always exempt from this confusion. The Mysteries can be explained as much as is needed in order to believe them; but one can not comprehend them, nor show how they arise; even in physics we explain several sensible qualities up to a certain point, but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is it possible for us, either, to prove the Mysteries by reason: for everything that can be proved a priori, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All that remains for us to do, therefore, after having given faith to the Mysteries on the basis of the proofs of the truth of Religion (what one calls the motives of credibility), is to be able to support them against objections; without which we would have no grounds for believing them; since everything that can be refuted in a solid and demonstrative way cannot but be false; and the proofs of the truth of religion, which can give only a moral certitude, would be counterbalanced and even outweighed by the objections which would give an absolute certitude, if they were convincing and entirely conclusive. This little can suffice us to remove the difficulties regarding the use of Reason and Philosophy with regard to religion.”42

The section opens with the distinction between "explaining," "comprehending," "proving," and "supporting," a distinction that is often later repeated and confirmed:43 the mysteries can be explained, but they cannot be comprehended; they can be (actually they have to be) supported against objections, but they cannot be proved. It is clear that "supporting against objections," recalls the ‘strategy of defence’, which has its basis in the fact that the mysteries cannot be "proved a priori, or by pure reason."44 That is to say, the mysteries cannot be proved by the analysis of the notion in question, obtaining a distinct knowledge of all the elements that compose it. An analysis of this type, pushed to its last terms, would, in fact, coincide with comprehension:45 but this is by definition impossible in the case of the mysteries, since they are truths superior to human reason. Just as the mysteries cannot be proved a priori, likewise one cannot even “make it understood how they come about” or “push reasoning as far as the how of the mystery,”46 as this would coincide once again with “comprehending” the mysteries.47
The unprovability of the mysteries does not, however, take away the necessity of "proofs of the truth of Religion" or "motives of credibility" in order for us to justifiably believe (or to consider true) the mysteries.48 These are proofs that cannot give an "absolute" certainty (as would be the case with a priori proofs) but a "moral" certainty, based on positive truths or truths of fact.49 Also in the "Preliminary Discourse," the "motives of credibility" can be organized into three broad categories already found in the “Commentatiuncula de Judice Controversiarum”. The starting point is the admission that the Scriptures cannot be the arbiter of their own authenticity: although the Bible claims to be the Word of God, the veracity of this assertion must be proved from other sources. In fact, if a self-testimony of authenticity contained in the text were sufficient, there would be no way of distinguishing the divinely inspired Word of God from the numerous pseudo-revelations. It is at this point that reason intervenes: through historical research and philological analysis, it has the task of judging not the content of the revelation, but the authenticity of the text. It is therefore a question, first of all, of arriving at a philologically correct version of the Biblical text, starting from some fixed points on which all versions agree,50 and gradually reaching agreement on doubtful passages.
The role of reason, however, is not limited to a correct historical-philological reconstruction. Provided that the correct form of the text has been determined, there remains the problem of its interpretation, that is, the problem of the meaning to be assigned to the propositions contained in the text.51 According to Leibniz, faith is not a mechanical repetition of empty sounds, of meaningless formulas that one does not understand at all, but a form of knowing endowed with a cognitive value. The object of faith is not the words, but the meaning of the words (“fides est sensûs, non vocum”).52 In order to be able to believe one must therefore to some degree grasp the meaning of the words uttered: “For indeed we do not know what he [Jesus] said if we keep only to the words, ignoring their force and power.”53 “Faith,” Leibniz writes, “is believing. Believing is holding something to be true. Truth is not of words but of things; for whoever holds something to be true, thinks he grasps the thing according to what the words signify [Fides est credere. Credere est verum putare. Veritas est non verborum sed rerum; nam qui verum putat, putat sic rem se habere, ut verba significant], but no one can do this, unless he knows what the words mean or at least thinks about their meaning.”54 In short, there must be a certain degree of intelligibility of the revealed propositions in order for them to qualify as truth. At this point, however, the problem of faith in all its ramifications is posed: for faith has a strong but sui generis cognitive component inasmuch as many of the things embraced by faith are above the limits of human reason. This is, basically, the problem of the mysteries: if, in order to believe, it is necessary to understand the meaning of what is said, how is it possible to have faith in propositions that express the mysteries if they are by definition beyond the capacity of comprehension of finite human reason? Although aware of the difficulty of this passage, Leibniz thinks, nonetheless, that there is a solution. In fact, in sections 21 and 22 of the “Commentatiuncula” he writes:

“(§. 21.) This is a very hard problem, but not an insoluble one. For I answer that it is not always necessary for faith to know what sense of the words is true as long as we understand it, nor do we positively reject it, but rather leave it in doubt even though we might be inclined towards some other [sense]. Indeed, it suffices that we believe in the first place that whatever is contained in the meanings, is true, and this first and foremost in the mysteries in which the practice does not change, whatever the meaning may finally be. (§. 22.) Nonetheless, it is necessary that the intellect should not fall nakedly over the words, like a parrot,55 but that some sense should appear before it, albeit a general and confused one, and almost disjunctive, as the country fellow, or other common man, has of nearly all theoretical things.”56

The solution, therefore, is based on the fact that it is not necessary to have a clear and distinct (or even adequate) knowledge of the meaning of the mysteries. Leibniz adopts the same position in the "Preliminary Discourse" of the Theodicy (§ 54): "it is not necessary to require always what I call adequate notions, which contain nothing that has not been explained, since even sensible qualities such as heat, light, sweetness, do not supply us with such notions. So we agree that the mysteries receive an explanation, but this explanation is imperfect.” 57 For one to be able to believe legitimately in them, Leibniz seems to indicate two conditions: 1) one must have at least a confused understanding of the meaning of the mysteries, like the understanding that the ‘man in the street’ has of theoretical matters; 2) the mysteries must not be positively rejected, so that the presumption of truth can be saved. This latter condition seems to represent the necessary ‘corrective’, aimed at avoiding the risks inherent in any legitimization of faith in the mysteries based only on a confused understanding, which, as such, would not sufficiently guarantee the possibility of its object, that is, its non-contradictory nature.58 By laying it down that the content of the mysteries, besides having to present a certain degree of intelligibility,59 must not be positively rejected,60 Leibniz reiterates that reason is called upon to guarantee that propositions which are object of faith do not contain any proven contradiction.61
In sum, he indicates three tasks of reason leading to the identification of “motives of credibility” without which faith in an alleged divine revelation would be unfounded: 1) the historical and philological verification of the authenticity of the revealed scripture and of the authenticity of the testimony;62 2) at least a confused understanding of the meaning of the divine word; 3) the absence of a proven contradiction. While the third condition refers to the strategy of defence, the second coincides with the “explanation” of the mysteries "as much as is needed in order to believe them".63 To be able to believe, Leibniz specifies in the "Preliminary Discourse" referring to the Trinity and the Incarnation, at least an "analogical understanding" of the meaning of the mysteries is necessary, since one cannot consider as true "words entirely devoid of meaning" or “sine mente soni [sounds without meaning].”64 This explanation is anyhow very far from being comprehension and, Leibniz constantly reminds us, it marks a limit to human knowledge, leaving beyond the possibility of adeguate knowledge not only supernatural truths, but also an infinity of natural truths.65
Once the “credentials”, represented by the motives of credibility, have been presented before the court of reason, the latter must give way to revelation as a new light superior to it. As Leibniz writes in paragraph 29 of the "Preliminary Discourse," 

“Thus this is a thing that presents no problem for Theologians who know what they are doing, viz. that the motives of credibility justify, once and for all, the authority of the Holy Scripture before the Tribunal of Reason, so that afterwards Reason surrenders to it, as to a new light, and sacrifices to it all its likelihoods. It is a bit like a new Head sent by the Prince, who must show his Letters Patent in the Assembly where he will later have to preside.”66














^1	  This paper pulls together some treads and materials discussed in my book Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. The remarks on presumption can also be found in M. R. Antognazza, “The Defence of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: an Example of Leibniz's ‘Other’ Reason”, in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9/2 (2001), pp. 283-309. A date accompanied by an asterisk indicates the period from which the text probably dates; a double date indicates the difference between the Julian calendar (old style) and the Gregorian calendar (new style).
^2	  The "Preliminary Discourse" opens with the following words (§ 1; GP VI, 49): “I begin with the preliminary Issue regarding the conformity of Faith with Reason, and the usage of Philosophy within Theology, because it has considerable influence on the principal matter that will be discussed, and first of all because Mr. Bayle has brought it up everywhere.”
^3	  Cf. the article "Manichéens" in the Dictionaire historique et critique by Pierre Bayle. The edition to which Leibniz generally refers is the second, published in Rotterdam in 1702.
^4	  A brief summary of Bayle’s position was made by Leibniz in the summer of 1706 from an article by Le Clerc published in tome X of the Bibliotheque choisie of 1706 (“Remarques sur la Réponse pour Mr. Bayle au suject du III et X. Article de la Bibliotheque Choisie [9 (1706)]”, in: Bibliotheque choisie 10 (1706), pp. 364-426; see in particular pp. 394-401); Grua, 62-63: “In the Reply for Mr. Bayle to Mr. Le Clerc we find what follows on p. 18: ‘The doctrine of Mr. Bayle (discussed here) comes down to these three propositions: I. The natural light and Revelation let us know clearly that there is only one Principle of all things and that this Principle is infinitely perfect. II. The way of reconciling the moral evil and the physical evil of mankind with all the attributes of this one infinitely perfect Principle of all things surpasses the light of philosophy, so that the objections of the Manicheans leave difficulties that human reasoning cannot resolve. III. Notwithstanding this, one must firmly believe what the natural light and revelation teach us about the unity and the infinite perfection of God; as we believe, by faith and by our submission to the divine authority, the mystery of the Trinity, that of the incarnation, etc.”
^5	  Cf. in particular "Preliminary Discourse," §§ 1, 29, 39, 61.
